Relation to Previous Work
The first multi-party secure election protocol in the literature [Chaum 811 could not prevent someone able to break RSA from tracing ballots back to particular voters, although some properties about it could be proved under reasonable assumptions [Merritt 831 . A subsequent proposal did not at all protect the confidentiality of ballots from those conducting elections [Cohen & Fischer 851 . An extension [Cohen 861 , similar in nature to the original [Chaum 811 proposal, divides the "government" into parts, in such a way that all parts must cooperate to violate participants' privacy. Using such a protocol to obtain the optimal privacy protection obtained here, however, would allow any single participant to disrupt the entire election. Also, it has security against cheating that is only linear in the effort required of each participant, in contrast to the.exponentia1 security proved here.
The present work draws on two previous basic results. One is a "sender untraceability" system detailed in [Chaum 88b ]. It provides unconditional security against tracing the senders of messages and limits the disruption that can be caused by participants. The second is the notion of "blind signatures," which serves as a basis for untraceable payments and credentials, as introduced in [Chaum 851 and detailed in [Chaum 88c ] and [Chaum & 
Ballot Issuing Protocol
The protocol defined in this section in essence allows an applicant y to gve very high certainty to z that the ballot provided byy is of a form that allowsy only to cast a single vote.
Consider the following protocol between an applicant y and organization z :
(1) Once, and for all applicants, z broadcasts: a small integer security parameter s; a second integer parameter n; an RSA modulus N ; a prime d>N; and n distinct random units of the ring of residue classes modulo N (called units modulo N for short), denoted v j , where j E { 1, ..., n } throughout. (In ths protocol "random" is used to mean uniformly distributed and independent of everythmg else.) y-t: (read ') sends to 2") M=(mi,,), mi,, -vfl,(;) r& (mod N ) , where i E { 1, ..., s}, with q random permutations of { 1, ..., n } , and with ri,, random units modulo N .
z-y: C, a random nonempty proper subset of { 1, ..., s}. Eri,, Pro08 (sketch) Without loss of generality, fix k. The tuple (P, Q, M j defines the messages transmitted in an instance of the protocol. and A denotes the set of all possible such tuples. Similarly, B is the set of all possible tuples (q, ri,,) with l f k , 1CiGs and 1 G j G n . It follows easily from the protocol that each ITk defines a one-to-one correspondence between A and B. Moreover, by the mutual independence and uniformity of all the IT; and r,,,, the conditional probability distribution of B given ITk is uniform for each instance of the protocol. Therefore the conditional probability distribution of A given ?rk is always uniform and hence independent of ITk. 0 Theorem Assuming y cannot form dth roots of random units modulo N, then when z reveals dth roots modulo N of h distinct mk,j, with k j x e d and 1 <j<n, the probability of allowing y to learn dth roots of other than exact4 h of the vi does not exceed 1 / (2s -2).
Proof (Sketch) It is sufficient to show that, with probability 2 1 -1 / (2s -2), there exists exactly one permutation 7~ such that for each j , l<j<n.y knows an rj such that mkJ = v 4 ) r f . With probability 2 1 / (2s -2) there exists at least one permutation d such thaty can express each entry M k J as mk,j 'vnr(iy;d (mod N), since otherwise only one c allows y to succeed. (Notice that for y to successfully cheat, the mi,,'s must be properly constructed for each i E C and improperly constructed for each i C. But this implies that only one C allowsy to cheat.) It remains to be shown that there cannot be two permutations IT' and ?r" such that y knows r'k,, and r"+ with mk,, = vdvy'i,, = v,qf'jf,,(mod N ) for j E { 1, ..., n } . If there were two such permutations, theny would have been able to learn the dth root of a quotient v~u~v ; ' z .~ for some j with d(j)#ta'(j). But it is easy to see that the ability to compute roots on random quotients is polynomial time reducible to the abilty to compute roots on random units.U
Overall Voting Protocol
Elections are in three phases: first step of the ballot issuing protocol above. This is done only once for the entire election. Additionally, z broadcasts an assignment of an outcome to each vi, thus partitioning the vi into fixed, disjoint equivalence classes, such that each class corresponds with a distinct outcome. For example, assuming the election allows each voter to cast a single vote (as is assumed throughout) for at most one of two candidates, then the vj are partitioned into two outcome classes, one for each candidate.
Preliminary: In the preliminary phase, z broadcasts those thlngs mentioned in the Registration: During the registration phase, each applicant communicates with z . If z agrees to allow a particular applicant to register, then the applicant and t conduct an instance of the ballot issuing protocol of the previous section. The result of this is a tuple of n elements, mk,,, one element of which is selected by the applicant. This selected element is denoted 61 for the lth registered voter. (It is now assumed that n>>m) . The final result of the registration phase, which is broadcast by z, is the set of bl, for 1 G I =Zm, where m is the number of registered voters. It will stdl be possible for disputes regarding the b's to be resolved at this point without revealing anything about the votes.
Voting:
The voting phase is begun by z broadcasting the dth roots of all of the bl.
(Naturally, if this is not carried out properly, everyone will know.) Then, the I t h voter recovers the dth root on a vi, simply by dividing the dth root of bl by the corresponding rh,j. Each voter then broadcasts, under the sender untraceability protocol mentioned above, the root of the single vi recovered. Finally, each voter can venfy that the root of the vi sent by that voter was in fact available from the broadcast channel. The number of votes for a particular outcome is just the number of distinct dth roots of vi's corresponding to that outcome.
Payments and Credentials
The election protocol can be used to directly realize untraceable payments: each vi stands for, say, one dollar; registration is withdrawal from a bank account; payment is made by providing a shop with a dth rood on a vi that has not yet been accepted for deposit by the bank.
mechanism" [Chaum 85 and C h a m & Evertse 871. The vi serve as unique personal identifiers, one selected by each individual. Let di be distinct primes, with dkld and (dk,@((N))= 1, for suitably many k's. Each individual participates in an instance of the election protocol with each organization, using a dk unique to that organization. (see [Shamir 831 for why such use of the d, is secure.) If not all m votes are cast in any organization's "election," at least one participant is cheating. In this case, people reveal all their rk,, and 7rk, and those who are unable to show that their b1 corresponds to a Vj that was broadcast are revealed as cheaters and excluded from the protocol. This is repeated with different vi until no cheating is detected.
issues the kth credential to a person by providing the dk th root of the person's selected element, br; then and only then can the dkth root of the person's selected element with any other organization be shown.
A variation on the election protocol can also be used to implement a "credential The remaining unused k's each correspond to a type of credential. An organization
Discussion
It has been assumed that n was large enough to make the possibility of the same Vi being chosen accidentally by two voters acceptably small. This might require something like n =loom2, which might be impractical for large m. Another approach allows n =m.
It is based on the idea that voters will be able to reserve vi's anonymously. One way to do this by is using the "slot reservation" protocol of [Chaum 84a ], which has been improved by [den Boer 871. A simple variation allows reservations to be made and confbmed one at a time, using any sender untraceability system. (Reducing from 2m to m could be accomplished by elections using one dk for each type of vote.) If less than m disjoint roots of vi are broadcast, z could form and broadcast extra votes. Thus people who register and do not vote, in effect, allow t to steal their vote. Someone might entrap z, however, by allowing a vote to be stolen and latter broadcasting the real (different) vote, possibly untraceably.
The essential requirements of the communication channel are that z must not be able to provide inconsistent or incomplete messages to different voters, and that voters must be able to broadcast the messages required to untraceably submit votes. The lint property could be achieved in some cases simply by z making digital signatures on all messages including some kind of hash or (even all previous messages) and a time stamp, since if inconsistent messages become known, z would be incriminated.
The requirement that d be prime and > N ensures that (d,NN))= 1. To get certainty that a small d has this property seem diE6cult in general. It is easy, however, to modify the protocol presented to give exponential certainty that (d,+(N))= 1 using the idea that y and t can "fip coins by telephone'' [Blum 821 to develop t mutually trusted random units, after which z is required to reveal their dth roots. The probability that t can cheat is then t2-', assuming that z cannot cheat during the coin tlipping. This can be ensured if, for example, z provides the modulus used in coin flipping and is then required to reveal its factorization afterwards.
A natural extension is to divide among several entities various functions of t , such as: creating the random vi's; making the registration (withdrawal) decision; and signing the hi's.
Summary and Conclusion
Election protocols embodying robustness, verifiability of returns by voters, and unconditional security for voters' privacy have been presented. The techniques also allow untraceable payments and credentials.
